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Apparent complexity may come more from the problem than from the system that
learns to solve it. Simon (1969) illustrated this by describing the path of an ant
making its homeward journey on a pebbled beach. The path seems complicated.
The ant probes, doubles back, circumnavigates, and zigzags. But these actions are
not deep and mysterious manifestations of intellectual power. Closer scrutiny reveals
that the control decisions are both simple and few in number. An environment-
driven problem-solver often produces behavior that is complex only because a com-
plex environment drives it.
Language learners have to solve the extremely complex problem of language.
Thus, theories of language acquisition, like explanations of Simon's ant, might easily
overestimate the degree of control sophistication and innate neurological predis-
position that is required. Both Major and loup correctly characterize associative
(connectionist, constructivist) learning approaches to language acquisition as being
investigations into what representations can result when simple learning mecha-
nisms for distributional analysis are exposed to complex language evidence. Occam's
Razor is influential in the associationists' attributions of learning mechanisms:
Implicit knowledge of language may be stored in connections among simple
processing units organized in networks. While the behavior of such networks
may be describable (at least approximately) as conforming to some system of
rules, we suggest that an account of the fine structure of the phenomena of
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language use can best be formulated in models that make reference to the charac-
teristics of the underlying networks. (Rumelhart & McClelland, 1987, p. 196)
Connectionists test such conceptualizations by evaluating the effectiveness of their
implementations. Computational practicalities dictate that, for the moment at least,
this can only be done in a piecemeal fashion: Many separate models now address
the acquisition of morphology, phonology, novel word repetition, prosody, semantic
structure, and syntactic structure (Levy, Bairaktaris, Bullinaria, & Cairns, 1995; Mac-
Whinney, 1987; MacWhinney & Leinbach, 1991; Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986).
Even these simple "test-tube" demonstrations put the lie to Major's claim that behav-
iorism and connectionism "cannot explain creative aspects of language" (p. 351);
rather, they repeatedly show that connectionist models can extract the regularities
in each of these domains of language and then operate in a rule-like (but not rule-
governed) way. The current connectionist enterprise is an effort toward giving these
simple learning mechanisms access to the true complexity of the language evidence,
(a) by expanding the models within each domain, improving the low-level represen-
tations to give the learning mechanisms better access to the true richness that is
there in the speech stream, and (b) by combining different sources of evidence
(prosodic, semantic, lexical distributional, etc.) to allow interaction between these
domains.
Constructivists believe that
many universal or at least high-probability outcomes are so inevitable given a
certain "problem-space" that extensive genetic underwriting is unnecessary
Just as the conceptual components of language may derive from cognitive con-
tent, so might the computational facts about language stem from nonlinguistic
processing, that is, from the multitude of competing and converging constraints
imposed by perception, production, and memory for linear forms in real time.
(Bates, 1984, pp. 188-190)
At this point in her argument, Bates refers to Slobin's (1973) operating principles for
the learner processing strategies that result in this extraction of structure. But,
constructivist to the core, she elsewhere inquires, Where do these strategies come
from? They come from the environment, from the cues in language itself (Bates &
MacWhinney, 1981). Language is a complex, hierarchical, behavioral structure. Its
acquisition is rich in sequential dependencies: syllables and formulaic phrases before
phonemes and features, holophrases before words, words before simple sentences,
simple sentences before lexical categories, and lexical categories before complex
sentences.
It is a general rule of both phylogeny and ontogeny that complex structures
evolve by differentiation of smaller structures from larger. Accordingly, we do
not expect children to build words from phonemes, as adults do; rather, we
should expect phonemes to emerge from words... similar principles must apply
to the development of word classes and syntactic structures, a fact not generally
recognized in developmental psycholinguistics. (Studdert-Kennedy, 1991, p. 16)
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Nor, I would add, is it sufficiently recognized in SLA. Sequence analysis underpins
the acquisition of both phonology and syntax.
PHONOLOGICAL ACQUISITION
I agree with both Major and Ioup that we acquire abstract systems of phonology.
Their various examples show that (a) there are perceptual constraints on phonology
(the /f/ and /0 / contrast is notoriously difficult for both adults and children [Miller
& Nicely, 1955; Velleman, 1988]), (b) there are motoric constraints on phonology
(open syllables are indeed produced before closed ones, but do we need to postulate
more specifically linguistic universals to describe the primitive infant vocal tract?),
and (c) these at times moderate the direct influence of frequency of input. But,
surely, we do not disagree concerning the all-pervading influence of frequency in
the acquisition of phonology, whereby successful language learners acquire the
phonological system to which they are exposed? Vihman (e.g., 1996, chapter 6)
presents a bootstrapping account of the acquisition of phonological systematicity
where frequency and salience in input interact with the learner's productive reper-
toire—the available vocal motor schemes serve as an "articulatory filter," which
makes salient particular words in the input stream whose phonetic pattern falls
within the range of the learner's productive repertoire.
I particularly agree with Ioup's emphasis on the serial nature of the speech stream
where "the same acoustic features that characterize a sound in one environment will
be used to identify a totally different sound when the environment changes" (p. 356).
The acknowledgment of the sequence analysis aspects of speech perception, and the
interaction of acoustic cues, preceding and following context, and even lexical,
semantic, and syntactic context, served as the starting point for the first (McClelland
& Elman, 1986) connectionist model of speech perception. There are more recent
statistical models of speech showing how low-level phonotactics could be used by
the neonate as a cue for initially breaking up the continuous stream of speech
and how a metrical segmentation strategy could arise without recourse to positing
sensitivity to metrical information as part of a genetic endowment (Cairns, Shillcock,
Chater, & Levy, 1995).
BOTTOM-UP OR TOP-DOWN PROCESSING
Major is mistaken when he says that my account involves only bottom-up processing
and that I eschew top-down models (p. 352). Ellis (1996) lists the range of LTM
influences on STM, describes cyclical reciprocal interactions as learners bootstrap
their way to knowledge of L2 structure, and discusses the role of salience and
attentional processes in the acquisition of grammar. This account is entirely within
the spirit of Neisser's (1976) "cycle of perception." Experience of our environment
leads to modification of our schema, our schema direct our exploration of the envi-
ronment, our exploration samples the available information in the environment,
and thus the cycle continues. The same systems that perceive language represent
language. Thus, the "cycle of perception" is also the "cycle of learning"; bottom-up
and top-down processes are in constant interaction.
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THE "HOMOPHONY PROBLEM" IN PDP MODELS
Ioup quotes the Pinker and Prince (1988) criticism of the Rumelhart and McClelland
(1986) past-tense model: The original model should assign the same past-tense mor-
phology to homophonic verb pairs like ring/wring and right/write because they
contain the same sound sequences. Pinker and Prince (1988, p. 174) claim that this
problem arises because parallel distributed processing (PDP) models are incapable
of representing lexical identity. This is not true. By definition, homophones are
words of the same pronunciation but different meaning. To distinguish between
them, the model must have access to some level of semantic representation. Mac-
Whinney and Leinbach (1991) report simulations using a revised verb-learning
model where the phonological architecture is supplemented with additional nodes
for semantic features. These simulations rapidly learned that rang was the past
tense of ring, [action, auditory-result, high-pitch, object-thing, sharp-onset], whereas
ringed was the past tense of ring 2 [action, circle, completive, object-thing, positional-
change, surround]. The revised implementation also answered a wide range of the
other Pinker and Prince (1988) and Lachter and Bever (1988) criticisms of the
original past-tense model.
Ioup concludes this section: "The child must.. . determine which verbs have
rule-governed past tenses and which are to be stored as irregular forms" (p. 356).
This is the classic false equation of rule-like equals rule-governed. Connectionist
models demonstrate how one distributed associative learning system can mimic the
human learning characteristics of regular and irregular inflectional morphology both
in the LI (Plunkett & Marchman, 1993) and in the L2 (Ellis & Schmidt, 1996).
SYNTACTIC ACQUISITION
Ioup offers the ability of 3-year-old Elias to distinguish between embedded interroga-
tives and free relative clauses as evidence against sequential order accounts. I am
reluctant to comment without seeing a representative corpus of Elias's utterances in
context, but my interpretation is exactly the reverse. Elias is showing that he knows
something about the word order of questions. Furthermore, he is demonstrating
knowledge that words like ask and know behave differently from words like sat and
found. Elias has implicit knowledge about subcategories of verbs. In the terms of UG,
these words have different c-selection properties that would be represented in the
lexicon in terms of different subcategorization frames. Within UG, the differing
subcategorization frames then affect interpretation or production of a sentence ac-
cording to the Projection Principle (Chomsky, 1981, p. 29). The lexical items drive
the process. The Projection Principle marks a milestone in the evolution, over the
last 20 years, of theories of grammar increasingly putting more syntax into the
lexicon and correspondingly less into rules; the Minimalist Program (Chomsky, 1993)
marks the current extreme of this progression. So, we must ask, whence does the
learner acquire these subcategorization frames? No one, however nativist, holds that
this lexical information is innate. Everyone agrees that it is learned. The relevant
sources of evidence are (a) the distributional properties of words and (b) semantics—
The Sequence of Language Acquisition 365
the s-selection properties of lexical items, determining the particular number of
arguments bearing particular theta-roles, are a remarkably good predictor of c-
selection properties. Chomsky (1986, pp. 88-90) suggests that c-selection may even-
tually be entirely reducible to s-selection (Cook & Newson, 1996).
But putting semantics aside for the moment, there is a tremendous amount of
information about the subcategorization requirements of words to be had from
simple distributional analysis, as long as the analysis is done on a suitably large
collection of language (rather more than the handful of example utterances that
commonly appear preceded by number labels, either with or without a leading *,
in linguistics texts). In my original article (Ellis, 1996, pp. 111-112), I referred to
computational work on Markovian analysis of English word class. In particular,
Finch and Chater (1994) report the results of applying a standard statistical clustering
algorithm to data concerning the distributional frequencies of words in a very noisy
corpus of 40 million items from the USENET newsgroups. The distributional fre-
quency was simply counted over four words of context, that is, the two preceding
and two following lexical items. The cluster analysis produces a clear separation of
different word classes; for example, verbs cluster separately from nouns, conjunc-
tions are a bit like u;/i-words that resemble prepositions, which in turn are very
different from determiners (p. 301). But further, we can look within each of these
classes, for example, to see how the verb -ing forms behave. Then we see that ask
and tell behave very similarly, and they are quite like show and hear and very
different from be, and use, and put, and find (p. 303). Finch and Chater only report
the data on 28 verb -ing forms, and I fear that Elias's know isn't there. But these
distributional analyses, totally devoid of either grammatical or semantic input and
based on simple counts, can produce very interesting descriptions of linguistic struc-
ture with not only clusters suggestive of word class information but also subclusters
of words taking different subcategorization frames.
ALM AND OTHER METHODOLOGIES
Ioup claims that the audiolingual method (ALM) was prominent in education for
about 20 years but that, as a learning technique, it "was a dismal failure" (p. 358). By
this evidence, then, it's fared just about as well as Grammar-translation, the Cogni-
tive Code Method, Total Physical Response, the Natural Approach, and other com-
petitors. The histories of second and foreign language teaching demonstrate radical
swings in favored methodology (see, e.g., Kelly, 1969; Stern, 1983). All too often a
method is adopted for the decade or two necessary for students and their parents to
become dissatisfied, and it is then replaced by a fundamentally different alternative.
This holds sway for 10-15 years and the cycle begins again. There is a serious lack
of empirical evaluation of the outcomes of different techniques. One can only hope
that moves toward a scientist-practitioner model of SLA will redress this balance.
In my original article (p. 97), I mentioned ALM in the context of a range of other
teaching methods. It is far too simplistic to believe that a theoretical account of
language acquisition that focuses on surface form as a sequence learning problem
necessarily implies ALM as a pedagogical method. I stress again that I believe in
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a bootstrapping model where bottom-up and top-down processes are in constant
interaction. Some parts of our environment can be made more salient (e.g., by
"grammatical consciousness raising" or "input enhancement" or "focus on form"),
and learners are more likely to learn about the parts of the environment to which
they selectively attend. I am deeply concerned with the issue of consciousness in
language learning (Ellis, 1994). I take a functional perspective on language acquisi-
tion that holds that the primary goal of the learner is to communicate meanings.
Thus, my position (Ellis & Laporte, in press) concerning the relationships between
the theory and practice of SLA is somewhat more sophisticated than that implied by
loup.
CONCLUSIONS
loup concludes her response by saying that "Ellis acknowledges that there are innate
grammatical resources at work in language acquisition" (p. 359). I reject this charac-
terization and request a more careful reading (Ellis, 1996, pp. 101, 116-120) for my
views on linguistic universals. Although I do acknowledge that work within the UG
framework has provided the most complete description of language competence to
date, like Studdert-Kennedy (1991), I suspect that UG is neither a prescription nor a
program for development, but rather it is a partial and a posteriori description of the
phenotypic product of the developmental system. In this view, UG is a consequence,
not a condition, of development.
Meteorology has its rules and principles of the phenomena of the atmosphere
that allow the prediction of weather. Geology has its rules and principles to describe
and summarize the successive changes in the earth's crust. But these "rules" are the
descriptions and heuristics of science. They play no causal role in shifting even a
grain of sand or a molecule of water. It is the interaction of water and rocks that
smoothes the irregularites and grinds the pebbles and sand. UG is like the other
-ologies with its principles and parameters to describe language, and the rules of UG
have a similar causal status.
The evidence of language grinds on our perceptuomotor and cognitive apparatus.
The proper study of language acquisition is to chart the course by which perceptual,
motoric, and cognitive functions induce structure, from undifferentiated novice per-
formance to that remarkably differentiated native-like competence that can be de-
scribed by theories of linguistics such as UG. For me, a more relevant universal
concerns process and learning rather than content: It is to be found in efforts to
rationalize intelligence in terms of models of optimal (Bayesian) inference in the
presence of uncertainty. Nativists and empiricists will continue to argue about their
essential and principled differences, but in practice their enterprises are highly com-
plementary. SLA research is so much fun because there is both language and learn-
ing to be understood.
(Received 3 March 1996)
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